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Saudi Arabia sits in the middle of the world’s climate furnace. There are fewer hotter, drier places on the planet, and it’s only going to 
get worse as the world continues to dump 
carbon into the atmosphere. Since 1995, 
the world’s atmosphere has seen carbon 
amounts increase from 360 parts per mil-
lion (ppm) to an estimated record-crushing 
400 in 2015.1 Some researchers predict 
an increase in temperature of around 3 
degrees Celsius throughout the Middle 
East by 2050. According to climate-change 
researchers, the Arabian Peninsula even-
tually will become too hot for people to 
remain outdoors for more than six hours 
at one time. Writing in the journal Nature 
Climate Change, Jeremy Pal and Elfatih 
Elfatir categorically state, “by the end of 
the century certain population centres in 
the same region are likely to experience 
temperature levels that are intolerable to 
humans owing to the consequences of 
increasing concentrations of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases (GHGs).”2 Quite simply, 
these temperatures will overwhelm the hu-
man body’s capacity to cool itself through 
ventilation and sweating.3
Other indicators have emerged point-
ing to inexorable climate-change trends in 
Saudi Arabia and the wider Middle East. 
The summer of 2015 saw a “heat dome” 
settle over the region, sending tempera-
tures skyward — a harbinger of what is 
to come.4 As noted by New York Times 
columnist Tom Friedman, a heat index of 
163 degrees Fahrenheit was reported in 
the Iranian city of Bandhar Mahshar on 
July 31, 2015, described by a weatherman 
at the time as “one of the most extreme 
readings ever in the world.”5 Meanwhile, 
in the midst of their war with the Islamic 
State, Iraqi citizens in Baghdad rose up in 
spontaneous protest at the inability of the 
government to deliver enough electricity to 
keep the city’s air conditioners running. As 
noted in a poignant report describing ev-
eryday life in Baghdad during the summer 
of 2015, “The lucky ones drive around in 
their cars with the air conditioning on, visit 
shopping malls, or wait for the air coolers 
to switch on and huddle around them in 
a single room. Those without that where-
withal find cool where they can, sometimes 
swimming in dirty, sewage-tainted pools 
and canals.”6 
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Israel in September 2015 experienced 
its worst sandstorm since record keep-
ing began, a storm almost certainly made 
worse by abandoned farmland in drought-
stricken and war-torn Syria.7 During the 
storm, air pollution in Jerusalem reached 
173 times the national average, and power 
usage broke all national records.8 The 
same storm produced high winds and tor-
rential rains in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and 
undoubtedly played a role in the collapse 
of a crane that killed 107 and injured 238.9 
Elsewhere in the Gulf, Iran remained in the 
grip of a seven-year drought as reservoir 
levels throughout the country sank to new 
lows.10
These extreme cases will become 
future norms, regardless of the December 
2015 Paris Agreement. The tidal wave of 
looming environmental stresses adds yet 
another systemic factor to a region already 
torn asunder by civil wars, failed states, 
regional balance-of-power conflicts, mili-
tant Islamic extremism, massive refugee 
populations, foreign military interventions, 
and oppressive governments seeking to 
rein in their citizens’ demands for change. 
The world is seeing only the opening phase 
of a multidimensional crisis that promises 
to get progressively worse. While changes 
in the weather and further deterioration of 
the environment may not appear as seri-
ous as civil wars and terrorist bombings, 
the long-term impact of these changes may 
be just as serious. As noted by Haaretz 
contributor David Rosenberg, “It’s easy to 
imagine the sudden emergence of a Mad 
Max world where environmental disaster 
has plunged humanity into war, famine 
and financial chaos. More likely, we’ll 
experience climate change as a creeping 
process with heat waves and droughts that 
disrupt normal life for short periods, or 
whose economic and political impact is so 
gradual that it’s difficult to make a direct 
connection to the weather.”11 This perfect 
storm indeed will break over Saudi Arabia 
and the Middle East during the rest of the 
century — and we have almost certainly 
only witnessed the first cloudburst.
A GATHERING STORM
There has been plenty of warning of 
the region’s building environmental catas-
trophe. As poignantly noted by researchers 
in 2009, “The Arab countries are in many 
ways among the most vulnerable in the 
world to the potential impacts of climate 
change, the most significant of which are 
increased average temperatures, less and 
more erratic precipitation, and sea-level 
rise (SLR), in a region which already suf-
fers from aridity, recurrent drought and 
water scarcity.”12 
The year 2015 was the hottest since 
data started being collected in the late 
nineteenth century — coming on the heels 
of records set in 2010 and 2014.13 The 
summer 2015 heat wave in the Middle 
East comes after five Arab countries set 
new high-temperature readings in 2011.14 
Some scientists predict that the succes-
sively hotter annual temperature readings 
may suggest a dramatically faster overall 
increase in the world’s temperature.15 As 
temperatures keep rising, the region is go-
ing to become even drier. The Middle East 
already contains less than 1 percent of the 
world’s fresh water resources and is gener-
ally recognized as the most water-stressed 
environment on the planet. By 2040, pro-
jections by the World Resources Institute 
indicate that the Middle East will contain 
14 of the 33 most water-stressed countries 
on the planet.16 Summers will get hotter 
and winters shorter and drier, with annual 
rainfall forecast to decrease by as much 
as 20 percent over the rest of the century. 
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Some estimates suggest that annual rainfall 
may decline by as much as 50 percent.17 
All but six Arab countries of the Mid-
dle East suffer from freshwater scarcity, 
defined by the World Bank’s minimum re-
quirement as 1,000 square meters per per-
son per year. What little freshwater there 
is above ground will decline significantly 




will cause a 
reduction of 
water runoff 
of 10 percent 
by 2050, at 
the same time 
that demand 
for freshwater 
is forecast to increase by 60 percent.18 Two 
of the region’s major aboveground fresh-
water sources, the Jordan and Euphrates 
Rivers, are predicted to see dramatically 
decreased water flows by the end of the 
century.19 Those aboveground sources that 
remain will be severely stressed by pollu-
tion and decrepit public-works infrastruc-
tures. Researchers estimate that several 
cities in the Middle East lose as much as 
40 percent of their freshwater due to leaky 
pipes.20
The story of the region’s underground 
sources of freshwater is not any better. 
Underground aquifers are being sucked 
dry by growing, freshwater-hungry so-
cieties. In war-torn Yemen, for example, 
the capital of Sanaa and its projected 
population of over 4 million may exhaust 
its groundwater by 2025. Some sources 
estimate that as much as 50 percent of 
Yemen’s 24 million people already do not 
have access to safe drinking water.21 Iran 
is in the midst of what some describe as 
an epic water crisis as a result of persistent 
drought and disastrous water management. 
Over the last 50 years, it has exhausted 70 
percent of its groundwater.22 Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia are sucking an estimated 9 
billion cubic meters a year from the Disi/
Saq aquifers — water that has been under-
ground for tens of thousands of years and 












out of the ground. In short, the region’s 
already scarce natural supplies of water — 
rainfall and aquifers — are drying up.
Further stress on freshwater supplies 
is now coming in the form of salt-water 
intrusion from sea-level rises (SLR). Ac-
cording to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), the average rate 
of sea-level increase has doubled since 
1993 to an annual rate of 3.2 millimeters 
a year. Researchers forecast annual SLR 
of 16 millimeters a year by 2081. By the 
end of the twenty-first century, the world’s 
oceans may rise a total of three feet as 
ice in the Arctic and Antarctic inexorably 
melts.24 If the West Antarctic ice sheet 
breaks apart, researchers estimate that the 
world’s oceans could rise by as much as 12 
feet by the end of the century.25 Egypt is 
the regional state most vulnerable to SLR, 
although the Gulf states will not be im-
mune. An estimated 6 percent of Egypt’s 
GDP is at risk with an SLR of 1 meter. 
Some estimates show that 30 percent of 
For centuries, the MENA population 
hovered around 30 million, reaching 
an estimated 60 million early in the 
twentieth century. ... By 1950, the region’s 
population had reached 100 million; 
today it is estimated at 340-350 million 
and is projected to increase to 588 million 
by 2050.
Russell.indd   46 5/19/2016   11:39:33 AM
47
Russell: enviRonmental insecuRity in saudi aRabia
the Nile Delta could be underwater by the 
middle of the century and that Alexandria, 
one of Egypt’s largest and most impor-
tant cities, will be threatened. Tel Aviv 
and Haifa will also become waterlogged, 
placing an estimated 5 million Israelis at 
risk of dislocation.26 Qatar, Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates are also particularly 
vulnerable to SLR over the rest of the 
century. Qatar’s land area could be reduced 
from 2.6 percent to 13 percent depend-
ing on the level of SLR.27 Saudi Arabia is 
somewhat less vulnerable, as its cities are 
further inland.
Two systemic stresses must also be 
added to this cauldron: population growth 
and urbanization. For centuries, the Middle 
East/North Africa (MENA) population 
hovered around 30 million, reaching an 
estimated 60 million early in the twentieth 
century. Since then, the region has expe-
rienced one of the most rapid population 
growth rates in the world. By 1950, the 
region’s population had reached 100 mil-
lion;28 today it is estimated at 340-350 mil-
lion and is projected29 to increase to 588 
million by 2050.30 Population growth rates 
are slowing, but the bow wave of popula-
tion growth will break over the region 
during the next quarter century.31
As in the rest of the world, MENA’s 
population is shifting from rural to urban 
areas.32 These transformations are not 
always peaceful.33 In the Middle East, an 
estimated 56 percent of the population 
currently lives in urban centers; this is ex-
pected to rise to 75 percent by mid-century. 
Persistent drought and hotter temperatures 
will speed the growth of the region’s cities, 
as subsistence farming becomes untenable. 
The emptying of Syria’s countryside due 
to the extreme drought from 2006 to 2009 
is a window on the future of other societies 
in the region.34 The move to the cities from 
the countryside will also cause a decrease 
in food production, making societies ever 
more dependent on imports.35 New arrivals 
in cities will face inadequate, dilapidated 
and aging infrastructures, overcrowded 
housing, and governments already strug-
gling to provide water, electricity and 
basic social services. Cairo’s population 
is expected to double by the middle of the 
century, to 40 million.36 Life promises to 
be difficult in the region’s concrete heat 
islands, where a small minority of well-off 
citizens will sit in air-conditioned buildings 
while the others will literally bake outside.
THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA
According to the United Nations, 
Saudi Arabia’s population is expected to 
grow from approximately 30 million in 
2015 to 40 million by the middle of the 
century. Over 90 percent will live in urban 
areas by 2050.37 These populations will 
continue to be overwhelmingly young. The 
World Economic Forum estimates that 60 
percent of the MENA population is under 
the age of 25, with unemployment rates 
in some states for this group as high as 40 
percent.38 In Saudi Arabia, 37 percent of 
the population is below the age of 14; 51 
percent is under 25. Youth unemployment 
is variously estimated between 20 and 30 
percent.39 As a demographic, this group 
is generally well educated, with as many 
as 100,000 graduates annually entering 
the job market. By 2030, this market will 
have to accommodate 4 million additional 
workers. Education received in the Saudi 
system, however, remains overwhelmingly 
focused on religion and rote memoriza-
tion — of little use in a diversified private 
sector, where foreign nationals predomi-
nate. The International Monetary Fund 
estimates that 60 percent of Saudi Arabia’s 
labor force of 3.3 million are employed in 
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the public sector.40 According to the Saudi 
Arabia Monetary Agency, only 10 per-
cent of the Saudi labor force works in the 
private sector.41
The Middle East remains systemically 
vulnerable to the forces unleashed by ur-
banization. For the most part, the region’s 
political systems remain controlled by 
security-sector and familial elites with 
little space for wider popular participa-
tion and the development of civil society. 
To substitute for the lack of private-sector 
development, regional states have relied 
instead on bloated and inefficient gov-
ernment bureaucracies to provide jobs. 
In petrostates like Saudi Arabia and its 
sister Gulf monarchies, this is a means 
of distributing wealth to the citizens in 
exchange for their acquiescence to the 
political status quo. 
DILEMMAS AND OPPORTUNITIES
The central strategic problem facing 
Saudi Arabia is simply this: it depends on 
pumping increasing amounts of oil out of 
the ground to keep the state afloat for the 
foreseeable future at a time when the world 
is attempting to limit the carbon release 
produced by burning fossil fuels. There is 
an inherent contradiction between trying 
to slow the increase of the world’s tem-
perature and Saudi Arabia’s requirement 
to pump oil to fund its state and slake the 
world’s growing thirst for oil. 
The kingdom is in a race against time 
as it simultaneously addresses a series of 
strategic, political, economic and environ-
mental challenges: 
•  Build and pay for an infrastructure to 
accommodate its burgeoning population 
that includes an environmental mitiga-
tion and adaptation program. 
•  Make the necessary investments and 
political commitment to diversify its 
economy away from domination by the 
public sector. Saudi Arabia needs the 
private sector to become the engine of 
economic growth that will provide jobs 
for an estimated 4 million entrants to 
the workforce over the next 20 years. 
One recent study estimates the price tag 
at as high as $4 trillion.42
•  Transition from a carbon-based econ-
omy to one in which energy needs are 
increasingly met by renewable and 
cleaner energy sources, to help it meet 
its carbon-reduction commitments un-
der the Paris accord of 2015.
•  Continue to manage the politics of 
energy markets while simultaneously 
meeting commitments to reduce carbon 
output in such a way as to maintain the 
kingdom’s relative power and influence 
around the world.
•  Preserve the shape and identity of the 
state and the ruling family’s position as 
it manages all of the above.
It is difficult to overstate the magnitude 
of these simultaneous challenges, with the 
attendant wrenching and even revolution-
ary changes they portend for the kingdom. 
It is hard to conceive of Saudi Arabia 
as anything other than the quintessential 
petrostate. Oil revenue today accounts for 
approximately 85 to 90 percent of the gov-
ernment budget, 90 percent of all export 
revenues and 45 percent of GDP. In 2015, 
some estimates indicate that oil revenues 
generated $160 billion of government 
revenue in a total budget of $223 billion, 
$38 billion supported by deficit financ-
Russell.indd   48 5/19/2016   11:39:33 AM
49
Russell: enviRonmental insecuRity in saudi aRabia
ing.43 Saudi revenues are distributed to its 
citizens in many forms: government jobs, 
generous unemployment benefits, subsi-
dized gasoline, water and housing, and free 
education and healthcare. The kingdom 
spent an estimated $36 billion in 2013 on 
subsidies for gas, water and electricity.44 
Saudi consumers paid 45 cents a gallon for 
gasoline in 2015 and received electricity 
at a fraction of the cost paid by consumers 
around the world. 
During 2015, Saudi Arabia’s oil 
production totaled between 9.75 and 10.3 
million barrels per day, an increase of 
6 percent over 2014 levels, reaching a 
30-year high.45 The kingdom is thought 
to have a production capacity of approxi-
mately12.3 million barrels, 2.6 million 
barrels of which constitutes spare produc-
tion capacity. No other oil producer boasts 
this kind of flexibility. Saudi Arabia has 
historically used this capacity to smooth 
supply disruptions in world markets.46 The 
world is expected to continue demanding 
more oil, despite commitments to limit car-
bon release. Indeed, the world’s economic 
growth depends on access to reasonably 
priced energy supplies. According to the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), if left unchecked, world demand 
for oil could reach 120 million barrels a 
day by 2040,47 an increase from 95 mil-
lion barrels a day in 2015.48 Much of the 
additional oil needed to keep pace with 
global demand will come from Gulf states, 
including Saudi Arabia, where oil is much 
cheaper to get out of the ground than in 
other oil-producing countries.
The contradiction between the need 
for more oil and the need to mitigate 
climate change is addressed with great 
clarity in the scientific community. Recent 
research conclusively demonstrates that 
much of the world’s vast fossil reserves 
(coal, natural gas and oil) must be kept in 
the ground indefinitely if the world is to 
have any chance of limiting the world’s 
climate increase to 2 degrees Celsius over 
the rest of the century. Figures published 
in the journal Nature indicate that as much 
as 260 billion barrels of oil in the Middle 
East — approximately the amount of Saudi 
Arabia’s estimated oil reserves — would 
have to remain in the ground under such a 
scenario.49 Such an outcome would cer-
tainly reorder the geostrategic map that 
places Gulf oil producers at the epicenter 
of global energy markets — to say nothing 
of the associated political and economic 
challenges that would be created in each of 
these states if significant portions of their 
oil reserves had to remain in the ground. In 
the past, Saudi Arabia has demanded com-
pensation for any oil left in the ground as 
part of an agreement to limit global carbon 
release.
The strategic dilemma confronting 
Saudi Arabia is significant, but it is bet-
ter positioned than many of its neighbors 
to withstand systemic pressures. Therein 
lies the opportunity to sensibly manage 
the kingdom’s transition to an economy 
with reduced fossil-fuel income and output 
and an increased role for the private sec-
tor. Over the decade 2003-13, oil prices 
skyrocketed from $36 to $110 a barrel 
by 2011. The kingdom doubled its GDP 
to an estimated $750 billion (somewhat 
larger than Sweden’s and Switzerland’s) 
and become the world’s nineteenth-largest 
economy. GDP grew at an annual rate 
of 6 percent over the decade, one of the 
most rapid rates in the world. Monthly 
household income increased by 75 per-
cent, from $2,100 to $3,600; 1.7 million 
jobs were created (1 million in the public 
sector). Moreover, women started to enter 
the workforce, reaching an estimated 1.8 
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million, or 18 percent of the working-age 
female population. Saudi Arabia is today 
regarded as a high-income country; its esti-
mated 2014 per capita GDP was $24,000.50 
While the House of Saud has a de-
served reputation for extravagant lifestyles 
within its extended family, it must also 
be pointed out that the family responsibly 
invested oil revenues in infrastructure dur-
ing the period. The regime also brought 
down the national debt and put cash in the 




like much of 
the rest of the 
world, Saudi 
investments 
remained in conservative instruments 
during the boom in equities markets in the 
first half of the decade. As a result, during 
the 2008-09 world financial meltdown, 
Saudi Arabia remained in a strong posi-
tion, paying down its debt at a time when 
many other countries underwent grave 
macroeconomic crises and had to borrow 
to avert meltdowns. Over the decade, it 
virtually eliminated its public debt and 
compiled financial reserves totaling nearly 
100 percent of GDP. The period saw a 
staggering $1.6 trillion economy, including 
$300 billion in foreign direct investment, 
mostly in the petroleum sector. McKinsey 
& Co. estimates that by 2015 the state 
had compiled $1.4 trillion in financial and 
other assets. Approximately $450 billion 
was spent over the decade on transporta-
tion infrastructure, healthcare, education 
and social welfare. Electrical generation 
capacity was increased by 32 percent. 
Eighty-one new hospitals and 20 new uni-
versities were created.51 Giant construction 
projects like the Kingdom Tower in Jeddah 
were also launched; when completed, it 
will reach 3,300 feet, making it the tallest 
building in the world.
In addition to infrastructure invest-
ment, the flexibility provided to the House 
of Saud by its stockpile of cash was dra-
matically illustrated during the uprisings 
around the region in 2011. To forestall po-
tential unrest, the regime pumped another 
$130 billion into the country’s economy 









housing, and more mosques for the power-
ful religious establishment. An estimated 
$70 billion was spent on 500,000 low-
income housing units alone.52 The windfall 
has also provided the Al Saud with politi-
cal leverage over its neighbors. In a rever-
sal of fortune from the bitter disputes of 
the Nasser era in the 1960s, Saudi Arabia 
pumped an estimated $6.5 billion into the 
teetering Egyptian economy following the 
ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood gov-
ernment by the security services in 2013. 
Riyadh and its Gulf state partners have 
replaced the United States as the principal 
benefactor of Egypt’s ruling security-sec-
tor corporation now headed by President 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
Environmental mitigation and adap-
tation investments figured prominently 
in spending during the decade. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the oil boom is 
funding one of the longest-running and 
largest environmental-mitigation programs 
ever attempted. At the top of the list is 
Saudi Arabia’s investment in water desali-
The oil boom is funding one of the longest-
running and largest environmental-
mitigation programs ever attempted. 
At the top of the list is Saudi Arabia’s 
investment in water desalination.
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nation. The kingdom consumes nearly 7 
billion cubic meters a day, 50-60 percent 
of which is desalinated; annual demand 
is growing at 8 percent a year. The Saline 
Water Conversion Corporation operates 36 
plants that produce an estimated 3 trillion 
cubic meters of water a day, 50 percent 
of the kingdom’s water and 70 percent of 
all water consumed in cities.53 In 2014, 
the kingdom brought into production the 
$7.2 billion Ras al-Khair plant, the world’s 
largest desalinization plant. Located north-
west of Jubail, it is expected to produce 
264 million gallons (1.025 million cubic 
meters) of freshwater per day, as well as 
2,600 megawatts of electricity. In 2014, the 
kingdom invested an estimated $4.4 billion 
in desalinization projects.54 It will need an 
additional $53 billion in investment and 
20-30 new desalination plants over the 
next 15 years to meet the projected de-
mand for water.55 
Unsurprisingly, Saudi Arabia will 
need more electricity in the years ahead. 
According to the EIA, the kingdom in 
2013 began bumping up against its power-
generation capacity, estimated at 58.4 
gigawatts. Air conditioning accounts for 70 
percent of electricity demand, which will 
steadily increase as the region gets hot-
ter.56 Saudi Arabians consume an estimated 
nine times more electricity per capita than 
their neighbors.57 The kingdom will need 
to generate an additional 35 gigawatts in 
electricity capacity over the next 15 years, 
requiring an investment up to $120 billion 
both to add to and modernize inefficient 
and aging turbine systems. Some estimates 
suggest that the kingdom will have to 
double its power-generating capacity over 
the next 20 years to 120 gigawatts.58 Until 
now, Saudi Arabia has used oil and natural 
gas to power electricity generation, helping 
to fuel a steep increase in domestic energy 
consumption. Saudi Arabia today has one 
of the highest per capita energy consump-
tion rates in the world: 25 percent of all 
the oil it produces, with internal consump-
tion projected to grow at 7 percent annu-
ally. Saudi Arabia is expected to triple its 
domestic oil consumption over the next 15 
years. If current trends continue, one study 
estimates that the kingdom could become 
a net oil importer by the middle of the cen-
tury, depriving itself of its principal source 
of income.59 
Diversification of energy sources is an 
essential part of Saudi planning. To help 
lead the effort, the kingdom established 
the King Abdullah University of Science 
and Technology located on the Red Sea 
north of Jeddah. In May 2012, the king-
dom announced an ambitious 20-year, 
$109 billion plan to generate 41 gigawatts 
of electricity through a new solar program 
that would meet 25-30 percent of its needs. 
In parallel, it sought to generate another 21 
gigawatts in geothermal and wind power. 
There is virtually no human or industrial 
infrastructure in the kingdom to execute or 
support a program of such magnitude. Per-
haps unsurprisingly, the projects have been 
delayed. In January 2015, Hashim Yamani, 
president of the King Abdullah City for 
Atomic and Renewable Energy, the royal 
agency established to oversee renewable-
energy policy, delayed the projects by 
eight years: “We have revised the outlook 
to focus on 2040 as the major milestone 
for long-term energy planning in Saudi 
Arabia.”60 Under even the most optimistic 
of scenarios, renewable energy sources 
will provide no immediate relief from the 
kingdom’s overwhelming dependence on 
oil and natural gas for power.
The kingdom has also taken steps to 
increase energy efficiency. In December 
2014, it announced the imposition of mini-
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mum fuel/mileage standards for new and 
used vehicles, light trucks and automobiles 
imported into the kingdom. The standards, 
based on the U.S. Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, are 
to be phased in between 2016 and 2020. 
As part of the National Energy Phase II 
program launched in partnership with the 
UN Development Program, the kingdom 
introduced a campaign to put energy ef-
ficiency ratings on all new air conditioners 
and replace aging and inefficient units still 
in use.61 As many as 50,000 noncompliant 
air-conditioning units have been seized 
and destroyed by the government under the 
joint government-UN program.62 Finally, 
Saudi Arabia has adopted international 
building codes that make thermal insula-
tion mandatory in all new construction 
across the kingdom’s 23 cities.63
POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Saudi Arabia has been seen around the 
world as one of the main impediments to a 
global deal to limit carbon output. During 
negotiations in Copenhagen in November 
2014, one observer estimated that the Sau-
dis were responsible for 40 percent of all of 
the objections raised during the sessions.64 
Most recently, the kingdom led a group 
of 22 nations in successfully lobbying to 
prevent the adoption of more aggressive 
climate-change objectives. According to 
many observers, Saudi Arabia worked to 
water down the text throughout the final 
environmental negotiations in Paris in 
December 2015. It has also resisted pres-
sures to contribute to a fund to help poorer 
developing countries shoulder the costs of 
climate mitigation. Nonetheless, Saudi Ara-
bia joined 194 other nations in signing on 
to the Paris Agreement of December 2015.
Under the terms of commitments made 
to the treaty as its Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution (INDC) sub-
mitted in November 2015, Saudi Arabia 
seeks to reduce carbon emissions by 130 
tons annually by 2030. The plan offered 
no specifics on how its carbon-reduction 
commitments will be met and offered no 
numerical benchmarks by which to judge 
its progress. In 2012, Saudi Arabia was 
rated as the fourteenth-largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases in the world, releasing 
572 metric tons annually, or 1.2 percent of 
the world’s total.65 The Saudi INDC sub-
mission stated: “The Kingdom will engage 
in actions and plans in pursuit of economic 
diversification that have co-benefits in the 
form of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
avoidances and adaptation to the impacts 
of climate change, as well as reducing 
the impacts of response measures.”66 The 
Saudi submission also vaguely warned 
that its emission targets would be adjusted 
between 2016 and 2020 if the Paris Agree-
ment creates an “abnormal” burden on the 
Saudi economy.67 
The plan acknowledges the link be-
tween climate mitigation and adaptation 
efforts and high levels of oil exports. In 
addition to pursuing economic efficien-
cies and diversified economic growth, 
the plan calls for Saudi Arabia to develop 
carbon-capture and utilization technology. 
The plan calls for the kingdom to build the 
world’s largest capture-and-use plant, ca-
pable of purifying 1,500 tons of carbon per 
day, which will be recycled back into the 
country’s growing petrochemical industry. 
Another initiative calls for the insertion 
of carbon into underground oil reservoirs. 
Using a technology called carbon-dioxide-
enhanced oil recovery, 40 million cubic 
feet of carbon dioxide will be captured, 
processed and injected into the Othmaniya 
oil reservoir as part of a pilot project to 
determine feasibility. One can only hope 
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that the Saudis are more successful than 
the Canadians, who attempted to use this 
technology on oil fields operated by Shell 
in Saskatchewan.68
By recent standards, the Saudi sub-
mission to the Paris accord is significant, 
since the kingdom has been seen as one of 
the major resisters to any attempt to limit 
carbon release. It was accused by some ob-
servers of trying to wreck the whole deal, 
refusing to support more stringent actions 
to limit temperature-release targets to 1.5 
degrees Celsius, balking at the idea of try-
ing to decarbonize the world’s economy by 
the middle of the century, and demanding 
compensation for potential lost revenues 
from oil income.69 The German organiza-
tion Climate Action Tracker remained 
unimpressed by the kingdom’s INDC 
submission, referring to it as “inadequate” 
and among the world’s worst plans. The 
organization caustically stated, “If all coun-
tries adopted this level of ambition, global 
warming would be likely to exceed 3-4 
degrees Celsius this century.”70 The organi-
zation particularly criticized Saudi Arabia 
for refusing to establish any baseline levels 
for carbon emissions through which to 
measure progress or the lack thereof.
The politics of Saudi Arabia’s ap-
proach to the Paris negotiations remain 
inextricably intertwined with the politics 
of international energy markets. As nego-
tiators gathered in Paris to set limits on 
carbon release, Saudi Arabia’s oil produc-
tion and exports reached an all-time high. 
In the arena of energy markets, the king-
dom has been playing a different game. 
After profiting from oil averaging $110 
a barrel between 2011 and 2014, Saudi 
Arabia and other producers lost big when 
prices tumbled to $50 in 2015. Breaking 
with its past practice of cutting production 
to restore price stability, the House of Saud 
instead opened the oil spigots, ignoring 
repeated entreaties of its OPEC partners. 
While, on the one hand, tumbling oil prices 
hurt the kingdom’s short-term revenues, 
lower prices served a number of broader 
strategic interests. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that Saudi Arabia’s refusal to 
moderate supply was a way to pressure oil-
dependent rivals in Tehran and Moscow 
and drive high-overhead producers out of 
business to preserve Saudi market share.
Oil prices north of $100 a barrel helped 
stimulate a glut in world oil production in 
places like Canada and the United States, 
where it became economical to produce 
shale oil in ever-increasing quantities. 
These additional oil supplies also threat-
ened Saudi Arabia’s share of world mar-
kets, particularly those in fast-growing 
Asia. By March 2015, for example, U.S. 
production of shale oil reached 5.3 mil-
lion barrels per day (mb/d), boosting 
the dramatic overall increase in U.S. oil 
production to a 40-year high of 9.4 mb/d 
in May 2015. There is some evidence that 
U.S. shale-oil producers are feeling the 
pinch, with production slated to decline 
in early 2016. Opinion suggests that the 
Saudis have been successful in preserving 
their market share with their refusal to cut 
production.71 
High-cost producers, however, rep-
resented only one part of Saudi Arabia’s 
problems, according to some analysts. 
There was a deeper and more profound 
fear: a leveling off of the global demand 
for oil.72 According to this point of view, 
higher oil prices not only brought the 
more expensive oil onto the market; it also 
reduced demand for oil and further encour-
aged the move to renewable sources of 
energy. The slowing demand for imported 
oil in China was particularly concerning to 
Saudi officials, though some believe that 
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depressed oil prices actually buy Saudi 
Arabia and its OPEC partners more time 
by averting a leveling off of global demand 
in a higher-priced market.73 
Another line of analysis suggests that 
Saudi Arabia is attempting to maximize in-
come from a commodity that will gradual-
ly recede in importance as the world shifts 
to a non-carbon-based future. The Saudis 
must recognize reality: the inexorable 
move towards limits on carbon emissions 
will mean that some portion of their most 
valuable commodity will have to remain 
in the ground.74 The essential logic of the 
argument is that any barrel of oil sold at 
a profit, however small, is more valuable 
than one that is not. Oil that remains in the 
ground eventually will cease to have value. 
Preserving the primacy of their market 
share would thus allow the Saudis to maxi-
mize the value of their commodity.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
The economic and environmental 
pressures on Saudi Arabia are clear. It 
needs to continue pumping oil for at least 
the next couple of decades to generate 
the revenue needed for the infrastructure 
to accommodate its growing population. 
There is no substitute for oil income over 
the near term. The kingdom needs to figure 
out how to pay for more of everything: 
electricity generation, freshwater desalina-
tion, housing, public transportation and 
road systems, health care and education, 
to name but a few of the claimants on state 
resources. As previously noted, the king-
dom’s strong financial position provides 
a good start toward meeting its daunting 
economic challenges, although the decline 
in oil prices gives leaders less direct capi-
tal for their investment priorities. Some 
economists estimate that the decline in oil 
prices is forcing the Saudis to spend $10-
$15 billion a month from their reserves.75
Perhaps more difficult is the parallel 
political challenge that must also be met 
if the state is to move to a model in which 
the private sector drives economic growth. 
The domestic political challenges are 
complex and varied. If the political leader-
ship attempts to develop a viable private 
sector, it will be asking more of its citizens 
at a time when subsidies are slowly but 
surely being reduced. The workforce will 
no longer be able to live off handouts from 
the regime or rely on public-sector jobs 
and religiously focused education.76
There is some evidence that the ruling 
family is acutely aware of these problems 
and is taking steps to address the myriad 
challenges facing the Saudi economy. 
Deputy Crown Prince Mohamed bin 
Salman is coordinating a multifaceted ef-
fort to develop an ambitious five-year Na-
tional Transformation Plan to map the road 
towards economic diversification and the 
development of the private sector. Under 
consideration are such steps as asset sales, 
tax increases, spending cuts and changes to 
the way the kingdom manages its invest-
ments. Among other things, the plan calls 
for Saudi Aramco to transform from an oil 
company into an industrial conglomerate. 
Power to implement the plan reportedly 
rests with the newly created 22-member 
Council of Economic and Development 
Affairs. In April 2016, pursuant to this di-
rection, Mohamed bin Salman announced 
plans to sell 5 percent of the world’s 
largest oil company, Saudi Aramco, with 
the proceeds being used to set up a public 
investment-development fund that could 
reach $2 trillion in assets. The Saudis 
appear interested in following the trail 
blazed by the Al Nahyans in the UAE, who 
established the Abu Dhabi Investment Au-
thority to provide the emirate with a source 
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of income from a diversified portfolio of 
investments.77 These efforts dovetail with 
an aggressive campaign by the Saudi Ara-
bia Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 
to attract international investors to a series 
of new development projects.78
A better-educated Saudi workforce 
comprising both men and women will 
be needed if a viable private sector is to 
be developed to drive economic growth. 
Opening up opportunities for women and 
changing the country’s education system 
to give workers the skills they need will 
require the House of Saud to take on 
domestic political stakeholders like the 
religious establishment, which has been 
empowered and funded in the oil era. Past 
efforts by the Al Saud to open up their so-
ciety to the forces of modernity have been 
met with ardent internal opposition. The 
most dramatic expression of these protests 
was the takeover of the Grand Mosque 
by Juhayman al-Otaybi and his followers 
in 1979. Otaybi proved to be a precursor 
of militant Islamic extremist opposition 
to the ruling family that found expres-
sion with al-Qaeda in the 1990s and with 
the latest iteration as found in the Islamic 
State.79 The ruling family has in the past 
placated and co-opted these opponents, 
but this balancing act promises to become 
significantly more challenging if the coun-
try is to move in the directions outlined by 
the deputy crown prince.
Managing this transition as the world 
slowly but inexorably clamps down on 
carbon production and consumption adds 
another layer of complexity to a difficult 
situation. The commitments made in Paris 
represent the opening round in an ever-
tightening noose around the necks of the 
world’s carbon producers. Saudi Arabia 
can survive for a time through oil rev-
enues, but its days of profligate welfare 
spending are coming to an end. 
For much of the twentieth century, 
Saudi Arabia and the Middle East served 
as the strategic epicenter of the West’s own 
economic and strategic security. Cheap and 
readily available oil from Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf states helped support a century 
of relative political stability and sustained 
economic growth. The kingdom was the 
“prize,” a role embraced by the House of 
Saud as it fashioned its security partner-
ship with the United States.80 Outsourc-
ing its external protection to the United 
States suited the Al Saud as they focused 
on building a peaceful and stable internal 
political order. In some sense, the family 
always correctly foresaw that the most 
significant challenges to the state came 
from internal enemies. It remains unclear 
just how relevant that security system 
will be in the future as challenges to the 
internal stability of states throughout the 
Middle East multiply. The wisdom of the 
House of Saud’s prescient choices all those 
many decades ago will certainly be on trial 
over the coming transformative, and hotter, 
quarter century. 
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